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Abstract
We study a market where two universities, a public and a private
one, compete for students by setting admission standards. Students
di⁄er in ability and receive a wage premium for participating in higher
education. This wage increases with the quality of the university at-
tended. The private university maximizes pro￿ts, the public university
maximizes welfare. We show that there is no ￿same-standard￿equilib-
rium. In a speci￿c example we show that multiple equilibria can exist.
In one equilibrium the private university sets a higher admission stan-
dard, and in the other equilibrium the public university sets a higher
admission standard.
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The market for education displays several distinctive features. Often, large
public and private sectors coexist. In addiction, higher education provision is
an example of a customer-input technology (Rothschild and White (1995)):
the production of a good or service depends on the characteristics of the
customers. Allocation mechanisms are not limited to pricing: devices like
exams are often used by higher education institutions to ration demand
and to determine the o⁄ers of places made to future students. In fact,
because of these features standard theoretical results may no longer apply.
We observe that universities do compete for students and they do so by
setting prices and admission policies. Bearing this in mind, we study the
higher education market, concentrating on the competition between private
and public universities for students.
Compared with other aspects of the economics of education, models
of competition between universities are scarce in the literature.1 Like Del
Rey (2001) and De Fraja and Iossa (2002) we also use a duopoly model of
university competition, but unlike these papers where the two universities
considered are identical, we model speci￿cally the e⁄ects of di⁄erent objec-
tives pursued by private and public universities. The interaction between
these types of education institutions has received little attention. One ex-
ception is Epple and Romano (1998) where, however, the public sector does
not behave strategically and o⁄ers lower quality education. The later is a
good ￿rst approximation of the American reality, but in Europe, tuition fees
are often very low in public universities, and many private universities are
often considered to be of lower quality than their state run equivalents.2
In this paper we abstract from all di⁄erences between public and private
universities except for their objectives. The private university maximizes
pro￿ts, while the public maximizes social welfare. Both can make strategic
choices to further their objectives, speci￿cally: they both can choose their
students by imposing a standard for admission; in addition the private in-
stitution can choose its price, while the state university is constrained to
1De Fraja (2001) provides a review of the literature on private and public schools.
2A good example: Portugal has a private sector with a similar size to the American
one (measured by the number of students enrolled in private higher education): 31% in
the USA and 36% in Portugal, but here public universities set high admission thresholds
and charge minimal tuition fees.
1charging tuition fees imposed by the state educational authority. Students
decide to enroll in the university that maximizes their wage minus atten-
dance costs. This wage depends on their individual ability and the quality
of their education. Quality, in turn, is determined by the average ability of
the student body.
We study a simultaneous move game between the universities and show
that there is no ￿same-standard￿ 3 equilibrium: in no equilibria the stan-
dards set are such that the least able student in each university is of the
same ability. If equilibria exist, they must be asymmetric. We therefore
proceed to show, with a speci￿c example, that multiple asymmetric equi-
libria can happen for a set of reasonable values of the parameters. This
multiplicity may correspond to the di⁄erent patterns observed in higher ed-
ucation markets in various countries. The intuition can be described as
follows. Suppose the public university (which must set a low, or zero, tu-
ition fee) imposes a high admission standard. Faced with this the private
university has two options: it can either set a lower standard, thus meeting
the unsatis￿ed demand from students not able to pass the public univer-
sity￿ s admission threshold; or it can set a stricter standard and admit few
high ability students who can be charged a higher fee because they receive
higher quality education than in the public university. For su¢ ciently high
standard set by the state university, the former may be preferable. On the
other hand, for the same parameters, if the public university sets a lower
standard, the private university will be able to choose a stricter admission
threshold and charge correspondingly high fees.
The model is presented in Section 2, with the speci￿cs of students and
universities detailed in separate subsections. In Section 3 we show that
a ￿same-standard￿equilibrium cannot exist and describe the two types of
asymmetric equilibria. A computed example is provided and analyzed in
Section 4. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The model
A population of potential university students who di⁄er in their ability is
considered. A private and a state university supply higher education. They
3The term symmetric equilibrium cannot strictly be applied here as the universities
are di⁄erent. In Subsection 3.2 this is further discussed.
2set standards of admission and prices, although the state one must charge a
price decided by the educational authority, and is normalized to zero. Each
university sets a minimum admission score required for a student to be
accepted. We assume it is possible to represent the admission requirement
in one dimension and call it the standard of admission.4 Let this standard
be denoted by xi;i = p;s and let it vary in the subset of the real line X:
xi 2 X ￿ I R;i = p;s, where the subscripts p and s refer to private and state
university respectively. A student can enroll in university i if and only if her
admission score is xi or higher. The price or tuition charged by the private
university is denoted by t.
2.1 The students
Ability is measured by a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]. The students￿distribution by
ability is given by the di⁄erentiable function F(￿), with F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1,
with density f(￿) = F0(￿).
Assumption 1 There are no borrowing constraints in the market for
higher education.
If this were not the case, ability to pay the tuition fees would depend to
some extent on parental income or some measure of family wealth, and a sec-
ond dimension of di⁄erentiation of students would need considering.5 This
also tallies with empirical evidence: Carneiro and Heckman (2002) provide
a discussion on the topic suggesting that short run income constraints play
a minor role in explaining gaps in university enrollment by family income in
4The practice shows that admission can be determined by an exam or a composite
measure of students￿quality. Admission policies in many American universities require a
comprehensive evaluation of each applicant based on all the information available, includ-
ing letters of reference, essays, previous grade point averages, standardized test scores,
extracurricular activities, and sports performance, just to mention a few. We can ￿nd
examples of these policies described in detail in the American Supreme Court decisions
on the a¢ rmative action landmark case of Regents of University of California v Bakke
(www.landmarkcases.org/bakke/home.html), and more recently the cases against the Uni-
versity of Michigan (Grutter v Bollinger et al and Gratz et al v Bollinger et al).
5Fernandez (1998) provides a theoretical approach of the properties of exams and
tuition fees as alternative allocation devices under borrowing constraints, assuming no
peer e⁄ects. Romero and Del Rey (2004) analyze competition between public and private
universities under borrowing constraints. Their result that the public university is of
higher quality than the private one rests heavily on students being credit constrained. By
lifting this restriction we can analyze the robustness of their result.
3the US; for the UK, Dearden et al. (2004) also ￿nd little evidence that the
decision to participate in higher education is credit constrained.
Higher education determines a wage premium in expected lifetime earn-
ings. Evidence on wage di⁄erentials between secondary school and university
graduates strongly supports this statement.6 We also assume that the wage
is an increasing function of the student￿ s own ability and the quality of the
higher education received.
Firstly, we assume that wages are an increasing monotonic function of
ability. The return to schooling has risen throughout the eighties in the
US and several authors have argued that a substantial part of that increase
is related to higher returns to ability.7 Although early work on the size
of ability bias (Chamberlain and Griliches (1975)) reported it to be small,
more recently, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) sustain that, with an increasing
application of meritocratic principle in education, the interaction between
ability and schooling has become stronger and with it the importance of
the ability bias. Furthermore, recent evidence on the returns to cognitive
ability (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005)) also provides empirical support
for the assumption.
Regarding the role of quality, Brewer et al (1999) ￿nd evidence of a
signi￿cant, and increasing with time, economic return to attending an elite
private university. For the UK, Chevalier and Conlon (2003) also ￿nd that
there is a wage premium attached to degrees from more prestigious uni-
versities. The quality of higher education has largely been measured using
indicators of the academic ability of the student body. It is common to as-
sume that students￿productivity is likely to improve in the presence of abler
and more motivated peers. Epple and Romano (1998), de BartolomØ (1990),
and Nechyba (2000) point out the importance of peer group e⁄ects in the
context of education analyzing its role in theoretical models of school choice.
The existence of such e⁄ects is now established in the literature, although
there is still a wide debate about the form of such e⁄ects and the correct way
6Greenaway and Haynes (2003) report that university graduates earn around £ 400,000
more over their lifetime than non-graduates. In the UK, the empirical evidence on wage
equations points to returns to higher education quali￿cations for individuals with at least
one A-level that range from 15-26% for men and 26-43% for women (Blundell et al.(2000)).
7Taber (2001) ￿nds results that suggest that the growing university wage premium in
the last twenty years is mainly brought about by an increase in the demand for unobserved
ability.
4of testing them empirically.8 The measure of educational quality considered
is the average ability of the students in the university attended, ￿i; i = p;s.
Formally:
Assumption 2 The wage of a student of ability ￿ associated with higher
education is given by w(￿;￿), where ￿ is the average ability of the students
in the university attended; the function w(￿;￿) satis￿es w￿;w￿ > 0;w￿￿ ￿
0;w￿￿ ￿ 0.
We also assume, for convenience, that the wage function satis￿es a weak
single crossing property in ability: in the space of wage and ability, the wage
curve for a higher quality university intersects that of a lower quality uni-
versity from below. This assumption implies that the bene￿t of an increase
in the peer group quality (or simply the university quality) is weakly higher
for brighter students. It captures the idea that brighter students can better
take advantage of a better peer group.
Assumption 3 w￿￿ ￿ 0.
The students who do not participate in higher education expect to receive
a reservation future wage w0. A student of ability ￿j chooses to attend
university i if the future lifetime wage net of tuition is higher than in any
of the other two alternatives: going to the other university or not attending
university at all.
2.2 The universities
Universities incur a cost of educating their students which depends only on
the number of students they enroll, n 2 [0;1]. Denoting it as c(n) we assume
that it satis￿es: c0(n) > 0 for n > 0 and c0(0) = 0, c00(n) ￿ 0, and that there
are no ￿xed costs so c(0) = 0. We do not posit any di⁄erence in the cost
technologies of the two universities. This allows us to isolate the e⁄ects of
di⁄erent objective functions in the results.
We consider the game where the universities choose simultaneously the
standards of admission and the level of private tuition fee. Unlike other
types of ￿rms where adjustments in the quality of the product require more
time to become e⁄ective, so there is a clear case for choosing prices ￿rst,
in this setting the decisions on tuition and admission are likely to be taken
contemporaneously.
8Empirical evidence on peer e⁄ects is provided by Epple at al (2003), Robertson and
Symons (2003), and Sacerdote (2001).
52.2.1 Private university
The private university aims to maximize its pro￿ts by setting tuition fees
and admission standards.9 Universities can seek to maximize pro￿ts of their
teaching activity, so that they can use the available funds for research or to
raise the pro￿le of the institution.
The private university problem can be written as:
max ￿p = tnp ￿ cp(np) (1)
The tuition fee charged to the students does not depend on individual
characteristics. That is, unlike Epple and Romano (1998), private univer-
sities do not attract poorer but brighter students with lower or even neg-
ative fees (scholarships). In our model where income does not vary across
households, this possibility would be redundant. Moreover, this re￿ ects the
systems in place in many countries, in several European countries tuition
costs are ￿xed.10
2.2.2 Public university
The degree of autonomy of public universities varies across countries, but
we believe that it is uncontroversial that somehow public universities have
to follow governments￿directives. The objective of the government is to
maximize social welfare, measured by total income minus the costs of ed-
ucating the students in the public university, including the marginal cost
of public funds employed, ￿ ￿ 0. The source of this additional cost is the
distortionary and administrative costs of tax systems, thus raising the costs
of public provision (this has been often estimated empirically, see Browning
(1987)). The public university does not control the tuition charged in the
public sector, but we consider the case where this fee is lower than the one
9Epple and Romano (1998) also use such a function to describe the universities￿behav-
ior, but point out that considering alternative objective functions can make sense given
the existence of a signi￿cant proportion of non-pro￿t schools. Of course, this does not
mean that they are not institutions allowed make pro￿ts, but simply that pro￿ts cannot
legally be distributed to outsiders. Alternatively, De Fraja and Iossa (2002) maximize a
measure of the prestige of the institution, which is related to the number and quality of
its students and expenditure in research activities.
10Data from the European Commission shows that in the majority of the countries
students pay registration and tuition fees that can di⁄er by degree course, but which do
not usually depend on individual ability.
6charged by the private university.11 The tuition in the state university does
not a⁄ect the welfare function as it enters both as a revenue for the state
sector and a cost to the students, so to ensure that in every equilibrium it
is lower than private tuition we normalize it to 0. The objective function of
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The sets ￿i;i = 0;p;s, denote the range of possible ability respectively
for the individuals that do not participate in higher education, the ones
that attend the private university, and the ones that enroll in the public
university. These sets are derived below in Subsection 3.3.
3 Results
3.1 Students￿behavior
It is natural to assume that the probability of admission is an increasing
function of ability: more able students are more likely to pass a certain test.
Since our focus is on the competition between universities rather than the
test technology, we take a very simple formulation for this probability. For
any given standard x set by a university, there exists a function ￿t(x) such
that the probability that student j passes the test is 0 if ￿j < ￿t(x) and is
1 if ￿j ￿ ￿t(x). Our ￿rst result is that strati￿cation by ability of students
occurs under the assumptions of the model.
Proposition 1 Let xp and xs be given, with xp 6= xs. Then there exist
b ￿(xp;xs;t) and e ￿(xp;xs;t), with b ￿(:) < e ￿(:) and e ￿(:) ￿ 1, such that:
a) all students with ability ￿ ￿ e ￿ attend the university that sets the higher
standard,
b) all students with ability b ￿ < ￿ ￿ e ￿ attend the university that sets the
lower standard,
c) all students with ability ￿ < b ￿ do not go to university.
11Traditionally, in Europe, there has been free university education. The trend now
is to have increasing tuition fees in the public sector, but there is still a signi￿cant gap
between public and private tuition.
7Proof A student with ability ￿ ￿ ￿t(maxfxp;xsg) has three options.
She will choose the one that yields a higher wage:
maxfw0;w(￿;￿s);w(￿;￿p) ￿ tg
where ￿p and ￿s are the average abilities of students enrolled in the private
and state university respectively. Now, note that, since w￿￿ ￿ 0, then if
student with ability ￿t(maxfxp;xsg) chooses one university, then all stu-
dents with ability above her also choose the same university. This shows
strati￿cation above e ￿(:).
Next consider students with ability ￿ 2 [￿t(minfxp;xsg), ￿t(maxfxp;xsg)[.
These students can choose to go to the university that sets the lower stan-
dard or not to go. They decide to attend university as long as the wage net
of tuition (if the private university is setting the lower standard) is greater
then w0. As w￿ > 0, and w0 is constant, under Assumption 3 there exists b ￿
correspondent to the point where w(￿;￿p) ￿ t or w(￿;￿s) intersect w = w0.
If b ￿ < e ￿, students with ability above b ￿ go to the lower standard university
while the ones with ability below this threshold do not go. If b ￿ > e ￿, these
students do not go to university.
Students with ability ￿ < ￿t(minfxp;xsg) do not go to university.￿
3.2 ￿Same-standard￿Nash Equilibrium
Since the players have di⁄erent strategy spaces, we cannot de￿ne a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium. In this subsection we investigate whether there are
equilibria such that the lowest ability student accepted in both universities
has the same ability. We call this ￿same-standard￿equilibrium. This does
not necessarily mean that the standard of admission is the same. The next
proposition establishes the impossibility of such equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There is no "same-standard" equilibrium in pure strategies
where the universities set strictly positive standards.
Before moving to the general case, we can prove a useful result under a
strict single crossing condition of the wage function:
Lemma 1 If w￿￿ > 0, for every level of ability ￿, there is a single level of
ability that makes the students indi⁄erent between going to private or state
university. All the students with ability above that level prefer to attend the
private university.
8w
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Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 1
Proof Let the standards set by the universities, xp and xs, be such that
the ability of the least able student still satisfying those standards is ￿p = ￿s.
From Assumption 2 we know that if a student is indi⁄erent between going
to a private or a public university it must be the case that ￿p > ￿s. On
the other hand, with w￿￿ > 0 the wage functions cross only once, so all the
students of ability higher than ￿p = ￿s strictly prefer to enroll in the private
university. Figure 1 illustrates that case.￿
We can now proceed to prove Proposition 2.
Proof Suppose that there is a ￿same-standard￿equilibrium. Let ￿￿ =
￿p = ￿s denote the equilibrium ability level of the least able student. It
must be that students of this ability are indi⁄erent between going to the
two universities. Because the distribution of ability is di⁄erentiable, there
exists ￿ > 0 such that students of ability ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿￿ +￿] are also indi⁄erent.
By Lemma 1 we know that if w￿￿ > 0 this is not the case.
Let now w￿￿ = 0 for some ￿: Note that the argument given in Lemma 1
applies to any right neighborhood of ￿￿, therefore lets consider that w￿￿ = 0
in a right neighborhood of ￿￿. Let p(￿) be the proportion of students of
ability ￿ that attend the state university and   < ￿ such that:














Figure 2: Illustration of condition (5)
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To clarify condition (3) consider Figure 2. Above the dotted line we have the
proportion of students of each ability level that go to the private university,
while the proportion of students below, p(￿), go to the public university. It
is then possible to ￿nd   such that sections I and II have the same area,
therefore satisfying condition (3). If the private university increases the
standard by   it will capture all students in the interval [￿￿ +  ;￿￿ + ￿].
The cost of this move is null as the number of students it now attracts is
the same as the one of students lost (given by areas II and I in the picture),
as they can no longer meet the new standard. The average ability of the
students attending the private university increases, so this university can
charge higher tuition and increase pro￿t. So there is an incentive to deviate
from ￿￿, hence it cannot be an equilibrium.￿
Intuitively it seems reasonable to think that a ￿same-standard￿equilib-
rium could not occur. A standard that leads to least able students accepted
of the same ability gives a signal that the quality in both universities is the
same. If so, there is no reason to pay higher tuition in a private university
and get a degree of the same quality as one that could be achieved in the
public university.
100 qp qs 1
do not go private state
Case S
0 qp qs 1
do not go private state
0 qp qs 1
do not go private state
Case S
0 qs qp 1
do not go private state
Case P
0 qs qp 1
do not go private private state state
Case P
Figure 3: Strati￿cation of students by ability in each case
3.3 Asymmetric Nash Equilibria
Having excluded the possibility of ￿same-standard￿equilibrium, we turn to
situations of asymmetry. Only two possible equilibrium con￿gurations need
to be considered given our result of strati￿cation by ability (Proposition 1).
Figure 3 depicts both these patterns in the space of ability.
￿ Case P: the strati￿cation pattern is such that, the lowest ability stu-
dents do not go to university, the students with intermediate ability
go to the state university, and the higher ability students choose to
attend the private university;
￿ Case S: the strati￿cation pattern holds that the lowest ability students
do not participate in university, the intermediate ability students go to
the private university, while the higher ability ones enroll in the state
university.
3.3.1 Case P: xp > xs
Let ￿i, i = p;s, be the ability level of the lowest ability students accepted
in university i. In this strati￿cation pattern the number of students in each
university is:
np(￿p) = 1 ￿ F(￿p) ns(￿p;￿s) = F(￿p) ￿ F(￿s) (4)











11The private university charges a tuition fee to all students such that the
least able student admitted is indi⁄erent between attending the private or
the public university:
t(￿p;￿s) = w(￿p;￿p(￿p)) ￿ w(￿p;￿s(￿p;￿s))
Substituting t(:) in the private university￿ s objective function, we can
write the problem as:
max
￿p
￿p = fw(￿p;￿p(￿p)) ￿ w(￿p;￿s(￿p;￿s)gnp(￿p) ￿ c(np(￿p)) (6)
The state university sets a lower standard, so it is able to supply higher
education to students of ability in the interval [￿s;￿p[. The public university






























3.3.2 Case S: xp < xs
In the second equilibrium con￿guration public university has a higher stan-
dard of admission. Again, by strati￿cation we have the students with ability
between [￿s;1] attending the public university, the students of ability in the
interval [￿p;￿s] going to private higher education, and the remaining stu-
dents not enrolled in this level of education. The number of students in
each type of education is:
np(￿p;￿s) = F(￿s) ￿ F(￿p) ns(￿s) = 1 ￿ F(￿s) (8)










It is possible to determine the tuition fee that the private university can
charge by ￿nding the maximum the least able accepted student is willing to
pay to enroll:
t(￿p;￿s) = w(￿p;￿p(￿p;￿s)) ￿ w0
12Therefore the private university solves:
max
￿p
￿p = fw(￿p;￿p(￿p;￿s)) ￿ w0gnp(￿p;￿s) ￿ c(np(￿p;￿s)) (10)
The public university sets the higher standard, so the problem can be





























￿ w(￿p;￿p(￿p;￿s)) ￿ t(￿p;￿s)
4 The example
To show that the asymmetric equilibrium can exist for a set of parameter
values we will specify functional forms for the equations in the model. As
the objective of the paper is to show that both con￿gurations of equilibria
can be found for the same parameter set this is su¢ cient. The following
functions are considered:





i; i = p;s (13)
F(￿) = ￿; f(￿) = 1 (14)
The wage function considered is a linear function of own ability and
university peer quality, where the parameter a re￿ ects the strength of the
second e⁄ect, with 0 < a < 1. The reservation wage is normalized to zero,
w0 = 0, and no shadow cost of public funds is considered, ￿ = 0.
4.1 Case P
Using the speci￿c functions (12 ￿ 14) we can write the objective functions
of the two universities (6) and (7). With those we can solve the game and















13Proposition 3 When a Nash equilibrium exists the universities will set
standards that imply that the ability of the least able students o⁄ered a place
in each university is:
￿NP
p =
4c2 + c(2a + 4) ￿ a2 ￿ 2a
4c2 + c(2a + 4) + a2 and ￿NP
s =
4c2 + a2 ￿ 2ac
4c2 + c(2a + 4) + a2
Proof Solving for the ￿rst order conditions of equations (15) and (16),



















2(a + c + 1)
￿
￿p
The Nash equilibrium satis￿es these two equations simultaneously.￿
4.2 Case S
To ￿nd the speci￿c expressions for the universities objective functions we



















Proposition 4 If a Nash equilibrium of this type exists the standards set




2a + a2 + c2 + c(2a + 3) + 1
and ￿NS
s =
c2 + c(a + 2)
2a + a2 + c2 + c(2a + 3) + 1
Proof As in proposition 4 we can solve the maximization problem of


















The above expressions for ￿p and ￿s solve this system of two simultaneous
equations.￿
14Figure 4: Characterization of equilibria
4.3 Nash Equilibria
We assume free tuition in public university and a welfare maximizer govern-
ment and ￿nd that multiple equilibria can arise. We can then characterize
the equilibria in a Cartesian diagram in the space (c;a), Figure 4 (Appendix
A describes the procedure followed to draw this ￿gure).
Area II comprises the parameter combinations that yield type P equilib-
rium, one where the universities set standards such that the ability of the
least able student accepted in the private university is higher than the abil-
ity of the corresponding student in the public university. Area I includes the
parameters￿pairwise combinations that satisfy multiple equilibria solution.
We can see that the equilibrium con￿guration where the private university
sets a higher standard of admission (area II) happens in a bigger area in the
parameter space, but multiplicity of equilibria is also a possibility (area I).
This gives theoretical background for the coexistence of systems described
in Section 1.
To describe some of the properties of the equilibria found we present in
Table 1 the values of some of the critical variables. We take as reference the
cost parameter and set it equal to one half. If the strength of the peer e⁄ect
is high, for instance a = 0:6, or low, a = 0:4, the equilibrium is of type P.
15a
p 0.515 0.059 0.242 0.970
s 0.192 0.627 0.000 0.404
p 0.591 0.042 0.204 0.997 0.165 0.042 0.292 0.292
s 0.199 0.603 0.000 0.401 0.331 0.574 0.000 0.671
p 0.609 0.038 0.196 1.003 0.168 0.042 0.291 0.291
s 0.201 0.597 0.000 0.399 0.335 0.565 0.000 0.662
p 0.685 0.025 0.157 1.022
s 0.213 0.563 0.000 0.393
0.49
0.4
Case P Case S
0.6
0.51
i q i q i p i p i t i t ) , ( i i w q q ) , ( i i w q q
Table 1: Equilibrium values when c=0.5
Table 1 gives the respective values for the ability of the least able student
accepted in each university, the value of each objective function, the tuition
charged, and the gross wage of the least able student. It is possible to see
that the number of students going to university is higher if the peer e⁄ect is
weaker, but the social welfare is also lower. The private university charges
lower tuition, getting a lower number of students, although of higher average
ability.
The observation of two points in area I, with a = 0:51 and a = 0:49
respectively, allows us to notice that the type S equilibria is socially inferior.
Although the total number of students is higher under an S pattern, the
private university is able to charge higher tuition for lower quality education.
This occurs because the improvement in wage terms of a university degree
makes students willing to participate. When multiple equilibria exist we can
look at the Pareto ranking of the solutions. When the strength of the peer
e⁄ect is higher than the cost parameter the equilibrium of type P Pareto
dominates, but if a is lower than c there is no dominance. The private
university reaps higher pro￿ts under an S equilibrium. In type P equilibria
the level of the standard set by the private university is greater than the
one the public university sets in type S, for the same values of all the other
parameters. This re￿ ects the concern of the public authority with the welfare
of the students in society. By setting lower standards the total number of
students with higher education is higher than in case P.
165 Conclusion
Universities can choose their students using prices and/or measures of stu-
dents suitability. We assume that the universities impose an admission re-
quirement and can charge tuition fees. Moreover the competition between
private and public universities is described. Two equilibrium con￿gurations
are presented. The ￿rst one ￿nds private universities setting higher stan-
dards and being of higher quality and is consistent with the ￿ndings of Epple
and Romano (1998). In equilibrium the public university concerned with to-
tal welfare chooses to locate in an area of lower ability to allow a greater
number of graduates. The second one has the public university with higher
quality. This arises if the public university sets such a restrictive admission
policy that the private university ￿nds it better to locate at the lower end of
the ability distribution, but capturing the unsatis￿ed demand for university
places.
We ￿nd that in the case of a government concerned with the aggregate
welfare of the potential higher education students and pro￿t maximizing
private university it is possible to ￿nd multiple equilibria. The con￿guration
where private education is of higher quality is an equilibrium for a larger
area in the parameter set, but the multiplicity result cannot be ignored. In
the multiple equilibria area, con￿guration S yields a lower social welfare.
The assumption that the private universities are better can be misleading,
but the model presented here shows that this con￿guration of equilibrium
is socially preferable.
The results found occur when the private university sets a tuition fee
independent of the students￿ability. This is a feature of most of European
systems. A possible extension be explored is to consider di⁄erent timing
for the competition game, speci￿cally studying the e⁄ects of having each of
the sectors as a leader. As it is not clear to us who should have ￿rst mover
advantage, we restricted ourselves to the simultaneous case.
A Characterization of equilibrium
Figure 4 is constructed following the procedure described below.
17A.1 Case P
First, the ability levels candidate to local maxima that satisfy Proposition
3 are ￿NP
p and ￿NP
s . For these ability levels, the value of each university
objective functions is ￿NP
p and ￿NP
s , respectively.
Second, the highest pro￿t the private university can achieve if deviates
and decides to set a lower standard is ￿DP
p . Also, it must be that this ability
level, ￿DP
p , is really lower than ￿NP
s .
Thirdly, if that is not the case we further need to check if the pro￿t when
both universities set ￿NP
s , ￿EP
p , is lower than ￿NP
p . The condition for the






















In areas I and II these conditions are satis￿ed, so the private university
setting a higher standard is an equilibrium.
A.2 Case S
Using the ability levels that satisfy Proposition 4, ￿NS
p and ￿NS
s , we ￿nd the
optimal values of each universities￿objective function, ￿NS
p and ￿NS
s .
If the private university deviates and sets a higher admission standard,
￿DS
p , the maximum pro￿t possible is ￿DS
p . If the state university sets a lower
standard than the private, ￿DS
s , then the highest achievable welfare is ￿DS
s .
As before, we also need to ensure that the deviation ability levels are in the
appropriate interval. When that doesn￿ t happen ￿NS
i must be greater or
equal to ￿ES
i .





















18We then computed the values of each of the ￿ki
i functions for ranges of
a and c, and verify when conditions (19)-(22) hold. Figure 4 represents the
results of this simulation procedure in the Cartesian space (c;a).
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